





# OPEN KNOWERS

WHICH EXPERTS SHOULD WE TRUST?



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## My Background

- Analytical Political Philosophy/Philosophy of Science
  - Evidence-Based Policy
  - Experts in Democracy
- Uncertainty & Expertise

#### Overview

- Problem: Knowing the knowers
- Solution 1: Individualistic approaches
  - Problem: scientism and epistemic trespassing
- Solution 2: Open Science as a Communal Approach
  - Problem: Research Diversity
  - Solution: judicious connections!



## The Problem of Expertise

- Advantage: experts know more than nonexperts (in a specific domain) (Moore 2
  - Inform individual and organisational judgem
  - Direct individual and organisational action

- Disadvantage: experts are fallible
  - Expert Disagreement
    - If two experts disagree, one must be wrong
  - Experement (
    - Every experts agree, maybe the all wrong all wrong the state of the







## Problem: Knowing the Knowers


- How can we recognise the knowers in a specific domain?
- (domain-relevant) experts can use their specialised knowledge to recognized ellow contratevant expert







- Nonexperts cannot use specialised knowledge to recognise the (domainrelevant) experts
- Nonexperts must rely on indirect market or recognition recognition.






### An Individualistic Solution

#### **Knowing Reliable Researchers**

- Nonexperts can recognise the (domain-relevant) experts in light of personal characteristics
  - Track-record (Goldman 2001)
    - Lack of expertise to evaluate
  - Credentials (Anderson 2011)
    - Not all credentials are good
    - Not all expertise is credentialed
  - Interactional Experts (Collins & Evans 2007)
    - If nonexperts recognise good interactional experts, they can recognise good contributory experts
    - Since nonexperts do not recognise good contributory experts, it is hard to recognise good interactional experts





## Problem: Spectre of Scientism

#### **Epistemic Trespassing**

- The individual expert is decontextualised from her domain-specific research environment
  - She is an expert based on personal characteristics rather than specific domainrelevant relationships
- She may be seen as generally reliable rather than as a situated expert

• Risks of ind

• Risks trust in science



### A Communal Solution

#### **Knowing Reliable Research Communities**

- Nonexperts can recognise the (domain-relevant) experts in light of research practices
- The individual expert is re-contextue to her research environment
  - Open Science
  - EG preregistration and registered reports, Open Data, FAIR Data, Open Materials
- Open research practices allow for others to evaluate research quality
- Open research practices enable others to know the demarcations of research



## Problem: Research Diversity

#### **Knowing Reliable Research Communities**

- A universal Open Science makes knowing good research communities easy
  - There is no universal Open Science
  - There is only situated Open Science
- Research Diversity: Open Science principles are implemented to fit the specific scientific and social situations of specific research communities (Leonelli 2023)
- A situated Open Science makes knowing good research communities hard
  - Is this different research practice bad in this specific research situation?
  - EG should this research community use FAIR data?



### Solution: Judicious Connections!

- Nonexperts cannot use specialised knowledge to recognise good situated practices
- situated resear practices Nonexperts must indirectly evaluation
- Nonexperts can rely on neighbor research committees to evaluate situated research practices
- Nonexperts can research communities trust:










### Solution: Judicious Connections!

- Process-orientated conception of OS: openness as coproduction of scientific knowledge among diverse research communities (Leonelli 2023)
- Judicious connections among local research groups give nonexperts access to second-order reasons to trust situated research practices
- Local research groups are best placed epistemically and socially to judge research quality
  - Specialised scientific knowledge: understand specific scientific goals
  - Localised social knowledge: understand specific social resources



## Implications

- Foreground judicious connections as politically significant
- (Domain-specific) nonexperts can access second-order reasons to know which research communities to trust for specific questions
- Prevents scientism and the risk of epistemic trespassing
- Promotes responsible use of situated science



## End

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